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THE HABCH OF WAR
THE BATTLE OF NORMJL~DY
(June 6 to July 18, 1944)
11~
part of the Calvados coast, where t.he British
Second Army under General Dempsey estab-
lished a number of beachheads; and (2) in
the Vire estuary and north of C.arentan.
where the US First Army under General
Bradley gained a foothold. At the end of
the first week of battle, these two armies
had, with the aid of an uninterrupted flow of
reinforcement-s, succeeded in effecting a junc-
tion and in consolidating a bridgellead
stretching in a semicircle wi thin the nerthern·
most of the red lines shown on our map.
On the other hand, the Allies also had con·
siderable failures: (1) British attacks against
Le Havre and the coast 80uth of that port
as well as the capture of Caen had been
frustrated, the troops to the east of the
Orne finding lhemselves in a precarious
position; (2) the Americans had failed to cut
off the Cotentin Peninsula at its narrowest
part, an object indicated by landingfl south
of Lessay, nor had they managed either to
capture or isolate Cherbourg. German for·
tified points were, moreover, continuing t-o
operate from within the Allied bridgehead,
a fact which also characterized the fighting
of the ensuing weeks. The invaders, having
the advantage of determining the time and
place of attack, must make the best of t.he
surprise element. Every minute counts in
pushing ahead as fast as possible before the
defenders can put their machinery into high
gear and bring up reserves strong enough
to oppose a concentrated attack. This is
why the Germans manning the first line and
in Cherbourg were fighting to the last in
order to give their High Command enough
time to move up and deploy for counter-
action.
CHERBOURO
Not until the end of the second week did
the Americans reach the west of the Cotcntiu
Peninsula at Carteret and begin tJleir north.
ward push against tho now isolated German
forces in and around Cherbourg. l\lean-
while, the British advanced toward St. Ll>
and Caumont, while bitter fighting raged in
the Tilly sect-or. East of the Orne, the
British remained hard.pressed, although
they were now being reinforced from the
air, the sea, and across the river. In this
FIRST BATILE CENTERS
The focnl points during the first few days
of battle were (I) east and west of the Orne
estuary and along the strip between the
Orne and the Vire Ri\'ers, i.e., the western
IN the small hours of June 6, 1944, FirstLieutenant Ohmsen, in command of afortified post on the east coast of the
Cotentin Peninsula, was the first to signal
the approach of the invasion fleet. The alarm
llOunded throughout the German fortifications
and garrisons in Western Europe. Around
1.30 a.m. the invasion battle, for which the
world had been waiting 80 long, Wll8 on.
LANDINGS
The amphibian operations were carried
out along familiar lines. Employing an
immense Ooot of more than 4,000 ships
together with several thousand smaller craft
protected by the combined Anglo-American
DAvies in English waters (the ratio of their
composition being about 3:1) and backed
by some 11,000 first-line aircraft, the Allies
let loose their customary preparatory and
protective bombardment. Apart from the
matter of quantity, there was only one
feature which distinguished this landing
from its predecessors in the Mediterranean:
the truly lavish utilization of paratroops
and air· borne formations. These were
ordered to get at the defenders from the rear,
to disrupt their lines of communication and,
if possible, to capture important traffic
centers.
Our map indicates the main areas where
landings were carried out from the air and
the sea during the initial phase of the inva·
,sion, those that failed as well as those that
succeeded. Among the failures were the
air landings on the Channel Islands of Jersey
and Guernsey (not on our map), which in
tum prevented Allied naval operations in
the waters west of Cotentin in support of
the air. borne troops that were la.nded near
the west coast of the peninsula. It is an
important fact that, except' in the area east
of the Orne estuary, air. borne troops were,
with all their lavish equipment, never able
to hold out unless they succeeded in joining
hands with formations landed from the sea.
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-Weeki':! Front Lines
The 61"11t six weeks of the Batt.le of Normandy
part,icular sector, the fighting took place in
wooded terrain, both sides forming hedgehog
positions and using infiltration tactics, mak-
ing it impossible to ascertain a front line.
Although t.he British were active around
Tilly during the third week, t.his period wa.~
marked by t,he battle for Cherbourg. Throw-
in~ large forces into the fray, General Bradley
tned to overwhelm the defenders in the
sho~est possible time. All the speedy un-
loadmg of heavy war material along the
beaches offered great difficulties, it eeemed
worth-while to the Allied comma.nd to risk
sanguinary losses if Cherbourg could be
captured with a minimum of destruction to
the harbor facilities. Heavily outnumbered,
tl.le defenders had after heroic fighting to
give way. At, the end of that week, the
northern part of the penill.8ula was in
Americun hauds, except for a number of
fortified points within the immediate area of
Cherbourg and for the northwesternm08t
comer of the peninsula, where German
troops fought on to the last. The Germans
had found time thoroughly to destroy the
port. Two weeks after the occupation of
Cherbourg, the Daily Telegraph reported
that no Allied vessel had entered the port
yet. Two miuesweepcrs had worked their
way to within I! miles of the docks, which
was 811 far us any of them had been able
to get. Thousands of mines completely
blocked the accellS to the inner harbor. As
long as these had not been oleared away
the Allies could not even get near the wrecb
of ships and other obstacles which were
still barring the way.
NAVAL SOREEN
During the ensuing three weeks, the
Anglo-Americans attempted to expand their
bridgehead toward the south. A frontal
attack in the direction of Lessay did not
get beyond La Haye-du-Puits where, after
a fluctnating battle, the Germans halted
the southward advance. Equally unsuccess-
ful were attacks made from Curentan in a
southwesterly direction toward IJeriers. The
defenders did not withdraw toward the
Lessa~-Periers area until the sixth w~k,
nor did the Americaus reach St. Lo before
July 18. In counterattacks, German tanks
even penetrated beyond the Taute· Vire
canal. The British, lldvancing toward Caen
from the north and west, occu pied that part
of the town which is situated west of the
Orn~. Their thrust across the Odon River
failed to reach the middle Orne.
The Allied Command has taken advan-
tage of ita tremendous naval superiority and
THE MARCH OF WAR
Ilia used the firing power and mobility of
itl'heavy warships to the ut·most. Protected
.., an air force far superior in numbers, the
AIied fleet t;howered the defense with a
vy barrage, except at those points where
eoutal guns of equal range and caliber could
I118wer them, as, for cxample, off Chcrbourg
aDd Le HaHt>. A battlcship of the Nelson·
Jod.ey cia!' with at least nine guns of tho
_viest caliber can fire t.wo salvos of f)
tons each every 90 scconds for sevcra'! hours,
or eighty salvos aggregating 720 tons per
bour. One hour's bombardment by three
battleships approximat('ly equals thc amount
of explosives dropped by 1,000 bombers in
a raid on Horlin. ]t is fairly Rafe to assume
lIlat thc German High Command will not
accept a decisi\'c batt-Ie withjn the runge of
Allied nllv.al gllns; t h~ Anglo·Americans, on
the other hand, ha\'c as yet hardly vent.ured
out of t ha t range.
ALLIED N l'MllERS •••
It ill rcmarkable that. contrary to expec-
tations, the invasion op('rnt.ions havo up to
the time of writing bc.-'Cn carried Ollt only in
Normandy ami nowhere ('be. Thi!'l and the
fact. that 'both armies in (;('ncral Montgom-
tlfY's arm~ grollp hl1 YO heel] swelled to a
Itrengt.h far exceeding t.hat of r('~ular armies
may he due to the e:\1:reme difficulties ex-
perienced by t.he Allies in their landings,
t.be Allies hn ving ulldcrl'Rtimated the power-
ful G('rman defense and Ilwir own casualty
rate. In Ihe sixth week of t he invasion th'e
British Second and lTS First Annie in
Normandy were estimated to be Itbout 40
divisions strong. In view of the fnct Ihat the
in\1asion nrmystation('d in the British Isles be.
fore JW1(' (i was estimated bv Germnnmilitarv
cireles at 80 to 100 di\'isions, t,his would
mean that. about half of it hUR been sent
across to Normandv. However, reinforce-
ments may be coming directly from America:
among prisoners recent Iy taken in the St.
16 sector there were troops shipped fTom
Now York only a. fort.night pre\'ioul<ly, with
one da,y't; stopover in England. ]n com·
parison to the tremendous l<i7.C of the' landed
armies, Ihe. pace at· t.heir diflllOc;:al for deploy-
ment and an (,ffeni'ivo into the heart. of
France is mther narrow, ail th(' more so as
the Germlln defem;e line hemming it, in
includes swamps. riveTS, f1ood('d a rl'l\l< , and
forests. •'t rong attacks for the purpose of
wid£"ning t he bridgehead int-o a large de-
.plo) ment IIrca a.re tlwrl'fore t.o be eXp<'cted.
There also re·mains the pOAsibility of another
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la.nding, perhaps to be co·ordinated with
netions from the Normandy bridgehead.
•.. A~D ALLIED LOSSES
A factor which has affected Montgomery's
plans is the new German weaIlOn \ .1, the
"dynamjte met(l()rs." Apart from the de·
stmetion wrought almost "ithout inter-
ruption SiJ1Ce June 16 in London and south·
ern England, where war industries, stocks of
arms, and communications have been hit--
entailing certain supply difficulties and im-
posing an additional strain upon railways
Ihrough the evacuation of London lind tho
mobilization of workmen in other COUll ties-
the Allies have been forced to employ a
considerable pe.rcentage of their air forco
against tho ba8Cs whence tho V·I 's are as·
sumed to be fired and against the flying
bombs them!!elves. The fact that owing to
V-J the invasion forces did not rt~ceive as
much air support as had originally been
pro\ided for was admitted by tho British
Prime Minister in hjs speech of July 6. But
what may be worse is that the V-I is hcrald-
ing a new kind of wnMa-ro the ('fleets of
which cannot be gauged as yct.
The Allied losses in men can onh' be
guessed at. .l3ut considering the fuet' that
most of tile time they hud to advance in
frontal attae'ks ugainst strong German forti·
fications and t.hat scveral troop transports
were sunk. losses are likelv to exceed 200.000.
Allied material lost duri'ng the first m~nth
of the invasion battle included, according to
the Germa.n High Command communique of
.July 8, 1.6135 planes and 1,059 tank!!, not
counting t.h08O lost at sea. 56 transports
aggregating 348,tiOO tons were sunk and an
ndditional45 ullils with a t.onnage of 2(ifl,000
tons damaged. 2 hea.vy cruisers, ... light
crllisers, 20 destroyers. one frigate, unci 10
E-boats were sunk; while se\'eral bnttleships,
22 cruisers, 25 destroyer:;, 13 E-bouts and
2~ special landing boats Sll tn.ined heM'Y
daJl1ages. Losses through mines arc not
included. Part of these German naval
Ruccesses were aehiE'\'ed by allot her new
weapon, the "One-Man Torpedoes.'
The attit.ude of the French populat,ion
hn.."l proved a disappointment to t he Allies.
Contrary to expectations, they found that
the majorily of the Frl-neh people were
indifferent or en'n hostile toward the ilwud-
ers. This is not to be wondered at. After
slIlTC'ring for months from Allied bombing
THE WINTER W.AR IN THE EAST
Nooember 1J 1943, to April 15J 194-1
In th~ December 1943 Y8U~ we gave an account oj the 8Um11ler campaign of
1943 carryi'lfl the 8tory tip t.o November 1. The JoUowing analY8i8 is a very brief
one, a8 the winter war ""a8 conducted along principlee "imilar 10 tl,08e di8C·U88ed in
connection with 'he 8ummer campaign.
SO\'rET OPERATIONS
An interesting factor is the cool reception
accorded in Mo8COw to the news from the in.
vasion front. The Soviets have boon wait.
ing so long for the invasion that they can
no longer work up much enthusiasm over it.
amount of pressure all along the front was
to prevent the Germans from denuding BOrne
parts of the front in favor of others, the
real attack was to be made Ly the First
Ukrainian Army under General Vatutin in
the Kiev area. The overwhelmingly superior
quantities of men and material asscm bled here
were to push westward and then to wheel
around toward the south in order to out 011
and annihilate the German armies in the
Dniepr bend.
In a way, the SOl"iets tried to repeat their
Stalingrad maneuver. Again the Germane
were standing in a triangle pointing east·
ward. In the winter of 1942/43 this triangle
followed the bend of the Don and had its
apex at Stalingrad. In the autumn of
1943 the trianglo followed the banks of the
Dniepr and had its point in the easternmost
corner of this river's bend. In the case of
Stalingrad the Russian success was brought
about by tbe breakthrough at Bogutcbar,
whence the triangle was cut off at its nar-
row base, and a subsidiary breakthrough at
SerafunoviehJ halfway between Bogutehar
and Stalingrad. (See our article "Tbe Win-
ter War," May 1943.) The plans in the
autumn of 1943 called for similar break.
throughs in the left flank of the southern
German armies, preceded by a push toward
the west with the purpose of enlarging t,he
area and number of troops to be cut 01I.
On November 3 the Red offel1'.live in the
Kiev area began. It made rapid headway
in the direction of Jitomir, which was
evacuated by the Germans ten days later.
But while the Soviets were celebrating a
great ,·iclory and the collapse of the Ger-
man front J they were hit by Field Marshal
Manstein in the left flank of their wedge
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attacks on their towns and villages, the
}'rench were placed in a new predicament
by the invasion, and tens of thousands of
French civilians have already lost their lives
in the course of the battles.
THE PLANS
AFTER Stalingrnd, the German HighCommand saw quite clearly that underthe prevailing circumstances a further
offensive into the depths of the USSR could
not be expected to bring about decisive
results. It decided to withdraw its armies
far back toward the west, nearer to its
bases and system of communications, and
thus to economize in men and material in
\Ciew of the expected demand for German
troops in other parts of the Continent. This
,,'ithdrawal, however, was to be carried out
in constant combat with the Red armies,
inflicting 011 them as large losses as possi ble.
Moreover, it did not mean that the Germans
ha\'0 abandoned the idea of offensives,
but merely that they are waiting for
the opportune time and place for them.
This is the strategy the German High Com-
mand had succe sfully employed during the
summer campaign of 1943, and it planned
to adhere to it in the course of the winter
too.
The Soviet High Command, on the other
hand, was in a different position. By
exerting frontal preSBure over a. very ex-
tended front, from Velikiye Luki to the Sea
of Azov, it had been able to gain much
ground during the summer but had not
succeeded in destroying German manpower
to any noteworthy extent. Even according
to their own figures, the Soviets had, ill the
period from July 5 to November 5, 1943,
captured only an average of 790 men a daYJ of
whom more than half were wounded. But now
the wint.er, always the most favorable season
for RUB ian armies, was approachingJand the
Kremlin apparently laid ita plan along a
new line. This plan has been made evident
by the course of e\'ents since November 3J
and it consisted of this: while a certain
